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1 Introduction
Why do individuals choose to join political parties? The benefits of member-
ship of political parties are often thought to include higher social capital, career
advancement, or both. Parties can reward their supporters directly with jobs
in public administration, or may use their influence to ensure that members are
given preferential treatment in appointments or promotions (Appleton et al.,
2009). In short, membership can bring economic gains. Equally, highly driven
or capable individuals may be attracted to, or recruited by, political parties.
As such, individuals with characteristics advantageous to social mobility may
be more likely to become members, introducing the problem of selection bias
(Li et al., 2007). This paper explores the relationship between political affilia-
tion and occupational advancement with respect to one of the most notorious
political regimes in history: the Nazis. Using a unique and highly-detailed
dataset of individual conscripts and volunteers into the German armed forces
during the Third Reich, we show that membership of the Nazi party (NSDAP),
the Schutzstaffel (SS) the Sturmabteilung (SA) and the Hitler-Jugend (HJ) are
positively associated with socioeconomic advancement, with membership in the
‘elite’ NSDAP and SS being associated with greater increases. However, we
go further and show that this observed advancement was largely due to self-
selection of individuals with different characteristics into these organisations,
rather than career benefits bestowed on members. NS members achieved social
advancement by being trained in occupations of a higher level than that of their
father. These individuals we identify as being ‘driven’ or of ‘high ability’ types.
Once this ‘early mobility’ is taken into account, the relationship between Nazi
membership and social mobility between father’s and son’s occupations is no
longer apparent. Finally, we explore how the timing of joining NS organizations
affected improvements in occupational status. We show that even among early
joiners, this self-selection effect dominates.
This study relates to a number of different literatures. Firstly, our analysis
of the social composition of Nazi membership, undertaken in advance of that of
socioeconomic advancement, makes a contribution to a venerable and extensive
literature on this topic. Secondly, we link to the literature on the economic
benefits of political membership. While membership of political organizations,
and the Nazi party itself, has been linked to benefits for companies, the link has
been less well established for individuals (Ferguson and Voth, 2008). To the best
of our knowledge, this study is the first to do so with respect to the Nazis. In
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addition, our work is linked to studies of social mobility more generally, as our
analysis identifies determinants of social mobility beyond political connections.
What are the economic benefits of connections to political organizations? A
number of studies have identified the benefits to companies of political connec-
tions (Fisman (2001); Faccio (2006); Claessens et al. (2008); Acemoglu et al.
(2013)). In the context of Nazi Germany, Ferguson and Voth (2008) estimated
that companies connected to the Nazi party outperformed their unconnected
competitors by 5% to 8% in terms of returns. The benefits to individuals stem-
ming from political connections are perhaps less well explored. Establishing a
causal link running from party membership to economic benefits is also difficult
due to omitted variable bias, as high-ability or ‘driven’ individuals may be more
likely to establish links to a political party. A study by Li et al. (2007) attempts
to overcome this bias by examining the relationship between Communist Party
membership and earnings of twins in China. The authors find, after control-
ling for a twin fixed effect, that the positive relationship between earnings and
membership disappears, leading them to conclude that individuals with superior
abilities joined the party, not that party members benefit from their political
position. Likewise, Gerber (2000) finds that former Communist Party mem-
bers in post-transition Russia had higher earnings, but that this was driven by
the selection of individuals with advantageous, but unobservable, traits (such
as ambition) into the party. Nonetheless, other studies of connections to the
Chinese Communist Party membership by Appleton et al. (2009) and Li et al.
(2012) do not find selectivity to be a serious problem, suggesting a causal effect
of membership on earnings.
In this paper we examine whether Nazi membership was associated with so-
cioeconomic advancement and explore whether membership was directly linked
to advancement, or if individuals with different attributes selected into the party.
This analyis is possible due to the availability of detailed individual level data on
German soldiers during the period 1936-1945. We go further and examine the
relationship for four categories of National Socialist organizations: the NSDAP
(Nazi Party), the Schutzstaffel (SS), the Sturmabteilung (SA) and the Hitler-
Jugend (HJ). In this way we capture a broader picture of Nazi organizations
and the characteristics of membership and explore differnces between memer-
ship of the ‘elite’ NS movements, the NSDAPand the SS, and the mass youth
movement of the Hitler-Jugend. Before looking at the benefits of membership
of these various NS organizations, we first explore the determinants of being
a member of each organization and attempt to address the question of ‘who
3
joined the Nazis?’ Our dataset provides a rare opportunity to examine Nazi
members relative to the rest of the population. Analysis of party member lists
can give you an indication of the social background of Nazi Party members, but
by definition omits those who never joined. The party member lists, such as
those formerly held at the Berlin Data Centre (BDC), also lack detailed infor-
mation on education and family background, important variables to consider
when analysing social class (Mu¨hlberger, 1991, p.25), information that is avail-
able from our sample. In addition, as previously highlighted, we can exploit
these data to examine memberships of different types of NS organisations and
not just the Nazi Party itself (NSDAP).
The analysis will proceed as follows: the next section provides a brief review
of the literature on support for the Nazis andand establishes the hypotheses
to be tested, while the third section describes the data used in the analysis.
Section four analyses the determinants of NS membership before the relationship
between social mobility and membership are explored. Section five tests the
robustness of our findings before the final section concludes.
2 The Nazis and Social Background
Understanding what motivated millions of ordinary Germans to support the
Nazi party has been the goal of historians and political scientists for decades
(inter alia Lipset (1960); Hamilton (1982); Childers (1983); Falter (1991)). The
various explanations proposed generally fall under one of a small number of
broad categories. Firstly, there are the theories that focus on the appeal of the
Nazi party to certain sections of society (King et al., 2008). These ‘group-based’
theories include those that consider the Nazi appeal to have been greatest among
those on the fringes of society, typically non-voters, who felt marginalised within
the Weimar system (Bendix, 1952). This theory has recently been challenged
however by Satyanath et al. (2013), who argue that a vibrant networks of clubs
and associations in Weimar Germany facilitated the rise of the party: high social
capital, not low social capital, paved the way for the Nazis. Other group-theories
emphasise the Nazis’ disproportionate popularity among certain social classes.
The social-class theory is perhaps the most venerable and persistent, beginning
with the work of Seymour Lipset, who identified the typical Nazi voter in 1932
as
“a middle-class self-employed Protestant who lived either on a farm
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or in a small community, and who had previously voted for a cen-
trist or regionalist political party strongly opposed to the power and
influence of big business and big labor.” (Lipset, 1960, p. 149)
That the Nazis were predominantly a lower middle-class party is also argued
by Michael Kater in his analysis of party membership (Kater, 1983). This
hypothesis is far from being universally accepted however and is opposed by
Hamilton (1982), who argues that disproportionately high support for the Nazis
was an upper-middle and upper-class phenomenon, as well as by Madden (1987),
who highlights the diverse social background of party members. Perhaps the
only group for which there is a near consensus regarding support for the Nazis
is Catholics: consistently, Catholics appear to have been less likely to vote for
the NSDAP or to become members of the party (inter alia Childers (1983);
King et al. (2008); Satyanath et al. (2013)). The other main view of Nazi party
support is that the NSDAP were not just a party which appealed to particular
groups, but were rather a ‘catchall party of protest’ which drew support from all
sections of society (Childers, 1983). The view that the Nazis were a mass-party
with widespread appeal is perhaps most associated with Ju¨rgen Falter, who
argues that class or confession based theories can only go so far in explaining
support for the Nazis and that the Nazis received support from across the social
spectrum must be acknowledged (Falter, 2000). Following this line of reasoning,
King et al. (2008) combine the ‘catch-all’ theory and the ‘group-theory’ in their
analysis of Nazi voting and find that, although there was a general swing towards
the Nazi party across all social groups, the party achieved disproportionately
high support support among the ‘working-poor’: those not directly under threat
of unemployment but nonetheless negatively affected by the recession of the early
1930s.
More recently, in keeping with the mass-support theories, the rational, eco-
nomic self-interest of individuals has been highlighted as an explanation for sup-
porting the Nazis, either electorally or by joining the party itself. According to
Brustein (1998), individuals will support a party if the benefits to supporting the
party outweigh the costs. With respect to the Nazi party membership between
1925 and 1933, Brustein argues that those individuals whose material interests
were aligned with the party’s platform were more likely to become members. In
particular, he highlights the ability of the party to recruit successfully among
the ‘old middle-class’, blue-collar workers in import-orientated industries and
male, married white-collar workers and concludes that these groups’ interests
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were closely aligned with Nazi party programs. Building on Brustein’s analysis,
Ault (2002) concludes that material reasons for joining the party became pre-
dominant only perhaps from 1930 onward and that non-material interests, or
‘identity politics’ better explains membership in the early years of the party.
3 Data
The dataset employed in the analysis of NS membership and social mobil-
ity was constructed from a sample drawn from non-commissioned officers and
lower ranked soldiers serving in the German armed forces during the Second
World War over the period 1936-1945. In total, a representative sample from 68
companies was constructed, comprising of units of all branches of the German
armed forces, most of which served in the army (Heer). Additionally, informa-
tion about members of the Air Force (Luftwaffe), Waffen-SS, and non-German
soldiers (mostly Eastern Belgians, Austrians, Luxembourger and French from
Alsace-Lorraine) were compiled.1 The sample is drawn from the former military
district VI (Wehrkreis VI) in modern-day North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower
Saxony (Rass (2001); Rass (2003, p.54ff)). The information in this sample
were compiled from the following sources and agencies: the WASt (Wehrmach-
tauskunftstelle fu¨r Kriegsverluste und Kriegsgefangene), the agency responsible
for compiling information on soldiers who were killed or were taken prisoner,
and the BA-ZNS (Bundesarchiv-Zentralnachweisstelle), responsible for adminis-
tering personal information about soldiers. This material was complemented by
information on soldiers provided by the Red Cross’s Tracing Service and a cen-
tral register on repatriated soldiers returning from war captivity (Rass (2001);
Rass (2003, p.61ff)).2 The dataset comprises detailed personal information on
each individual soldier, such as date of medical examination, information about
family history, such as year of death of parents, place and date of birth, and
religion, as well as information about an individual’s socioeconomic background,
as recorded on the date of enlistment. The descriptive statistics for the sample
used in the analysis are given in Table 1.
From the information contained in the sample, we can determine the occupa-
tion an individual is trained for, the occupation actually practiced at the time
1The overwhelming majority of our sample were conscripts, with less than 7% being vol-
unteers.
2The authors thank Christoph Rass for valuable information on the data set as well as the
Leibniz-Institut fu¨r Sozialwissenschaften (GESIS) for providing the data set.
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Table 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
            
NSDAP member 13,962 0.0212 0.144 0 1 
SS member 13,962 0.0198 0.139 0 1 
SA member 13,962 0.0654 0.247 0 1 
Hitler Youth member 13,962 0.348 0.476 0 1 
Other NS member 13,962 0.0514 0.221 0 1 
Roman Catholic 13,962 0.547 0.498 0 1 
Year of birth 13,962 1916 7.055 1900 1929 
Occupation Father 12,957 2.721 0.780 1 5 
Occupation Trained 10,750 2.600 0.831 1 5 
Occupation Practiced 10,753 2.633 0.789 1 5 
Occupation (Father) - Low 12,957 0.423 0.494 0 1 
Occupation (Father) - Middle 12,957 0.428 0.495 0 1 
Occupation (Father) - High 12,957 0.149 0.356 0 1 
Schooling - None 13,962 0.0163 0.126 0 1 
Schooling - Low 13,962 0.572 0.495 0 1 
Schooling - Middle 13,962 0.122 0.328 0 1 
Schooling - High 13,962 0.0586 0.235 0 1 
Schooling - Unknown 13,962 0.231 0.421 0 1 
Urban - Pop. up to 2000 13,962 0.466 0.499 0 1 
Urban - Pop. up to 10000 13,962 0.128 0.334 0 1 
Urban - Pop. up to 50000 13,962 0.170 0.375 0 1 
Urban - Pop. over 50000 13,962 0.236 0.425 0 1 
Age at Examination 13,962 22.86 6.509 16 45 
Volunteer 13,962 0.0657 0.248 0 1 
Social Mobility Score 10,000 -0.0194 0.913 -4 4 
Social Climb 10,000 0.271 0.445 0 1 
Social Fall 10,000 0.263 0.440 0 1 
No Social Climb or Fall 10,000 0.466 0.499 0 1 
Large Social Climb 10,000 0.0315 0.175 0 1 
Large Social Fall 10,000 0.0557 0.229 0 1 
Higher Training Mobility 9,994 -0.0582 0.945 -4 3 
Higher Job Mobility 9,550 0.0614 0.578 -3 4 
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of medical examination, and the occupation of an individual’s father. These
rich data allow us to investigate the link between socioeconomic background
and the membership of an NS organization, as well as the relationship between
membership and career advancement. Ideally, information on an individual’s
earnings would have been included but unfortunately this was not available.
We use information on socioeconomic background to categorise all individuals
using the Armstrong (1972) taxonomy, using occupational titles to differentiate
between professionals (e.g. doctors), semi-professionals (e.g. teachers), skilled
(e.g. tailors), semi-skilled (e.g. factory worker), and unskilled workers (e.g.
labourers). Each category is rank-ordered; unskilled workers are given a rank
of 1 while professionals are given a rank of 5.3 The dataset also provides infor-
mation regarding an individual’s educational background. The German school
system traditionally distinguished between three different school tracks: basic
school education, a medium degree school track and an advanced school track
which aims at preparing students for an academic education at college or univer-
sity. We use this three-tier scheme and categorise all individuals in the dataset
accordingly. This methodology allows grouping individuals into four categories:
the aforementioned school tracks serve as three broad categories, while one cat-
egory is generated to identify individuals without school-leaving qualifications.4
Variables reflecting additional individual characteristics, such as religion, age,
and place of habitation are also included, as can be seen in Table 1.
This dataset offers a unique set of opportunities that make this study worth-
while: first, our sample of German armed forces during the Second World War
allows us to compare members and non-members of a set of Nazi organiza-
tions and assess their differences with respect to socioeconomic characteristics.
Second, the data contain information about an individual’s education and oc-
cupation in addition to father’s occupation, providing a rare opportunity to
assess the role of education, societal background and intergenerational mobility
in detail. Third, the data allow us to assess membership in the following orga-
nizations separately: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP),
the official political party of the Nazis; Sturmabteilung (SA) and Schutzstaffel
(SS), two major paramilitary organizations of the NSDAP; and the Hitlerjugend
(HJ), initially the youth organization of the NSDAP and after 1933, an amal-
3Farmers are included in category 3 with skilled workers. Excluding farmers from the
analysis does not materially affect the results.
4Individuals that were missing observations were included in a separate educational cate-
gory “unknown”.
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gam of formerly independent youth organizations. In doing so we can uncover
whether membership of ‘elite’ NS organisations, such as the NSDAP and SS,
was different to membership of less selective organisations, such as the SA and
HJ.
It is also important to discuss the issue of potential sample selection and
the implications this may have for the external validity of the results. Firstly,
military samples have been criticised as being unrepresentative of the general
population, and that endogenous selection often occurs (Bodenhorn et al., 2015).
The concern primarily relates to volunteer armies, the decision to enlist can
be related to personal characteristics and labour market potential. As this
labour market potential is likely to be related to cyclical economic conditions, a
selection effect may result in those with the poorest prospects deciding to enlist
while those with better prospects remain in the labour market. As a result,
any sample of volunteers is non-random. As Bodenhorn et al. (2015) suggest,
this selection effect is not apparent in samples of conscript armies, such as that
analysed in this paper 5. Furthermore, the fact that Germany mobilised for
“total war” during the 1940s ensured that many more individuals, of various
ages and backgrounds, were conscripted than would ordinarily be the case in
conscript army. As such some 12.5 million men served in the German armed
forces over the course of the war, relative to a male population aged 15-44 of
around 16.5 million in 1939 (Parrish and Marshall, 1978; Mitchell, 1998).
Inherent in the sample is that NSDAP membership will be underestimated
if higher-ranking party members were less likely to serve as regular soldiers
and more likely to enter the armed forces as officers. However, this is likely
to bias downwards the estimated influence of membership on social mobility if
relatively “less-able” party members are the type that we capture in this sample.
This limits what we are able to say about the higher ranking members of NS
organisations but helps to identify the influence among the “rank and file”.
Finally, it is acknowledged that for most individuals in the sample, we mea-
sure social mobility at the early stage of an individual’s career trajectory and
not total or lifetime mobility. For this reason we concentrate on diffences in
observed, albeit partially realised, intergenrational mobility between members
of NS organisations and non-members.
5Of course some individuals may have been able, or indeed some more able than others, to
avoid or delay conscription.
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4 Analysis
4.1 Membership of NS Organisations
Our analysis is divided into two parts. In a first step we run a set of logistic
regressions to assess correlates of membership in an NS organisation. The data
provide information on an individual’s membership in the following Nazi organ-
isations: NSDAP; SA; SS; and Hitler Youth. This level of detail allows us to
assess the socioeconomic composition of supporters of the NS regime in great
detail. These different groups represented different branches of the NS organisa-
tion. NSDAP membership reflects a direct political dimension while examining
SA and SS memberships allow insights into the factors fostering the likelihood of
joining a paramilitary organisation of the Nazi regime. A membership analysis
of the Hitler Youth allows a view of a different dimension of the Nazi organ-
isational structure: the collectivisation of youth organisations in Germany to
prepare young people to be loyal supporters of the regime. The decision to
join NSDAP, SS and SA was largely voluntary, while the Hitler Youth became
compulsory for all males aged 10-18 in 1939 (Lepage, 2008). We run several
logit regression models explaining each of the aforementioned memberships us-
ing different specifications to limit any biases arising from multicollinearity and
omitted variables, with the results shown in Table 2. We estimate
NSi = α+ βOccupationi + δSchoolingi + λReligioni + γXi +  (1)
Where NSi reflects whether individual i is a member of an NS organisation.
By default, we control for an individual’s denomination to address the com-
mon finding in the literature that Catholics were less inclined to support NS
organisations.
As we would predict, being a member of the Roman Catholic Church re-
duces the likelihood of being a member of any NS organisation. In order to
capture social background or “class”, the occupation of an individual’s father is
included as an explanatory variable.6 All our models are designed as tests of
differences between a low occupational background and high and medium lev-
els, respectively. Generally, we find that individuals with higher occupational
backgrounds are more likely to be members of the NSDAP, SA, SS and Hitler
Youth. Exponentiating the coefficient in model 1 of Table 2 reveals that the
6As an alternative we included the individual’s practiced occupation. This generated very
similar results.
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Table 2: DETERMINANTS OF NS MEMBERSHIP
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odds of membership of the NSDAP were almost twice as high for those from
a high-status background relative to a low-status one. In addition to social
background, we also include information on the level of schooling to proxy the
educational status of an individual. We find a consistent pattern here. The
coefficients generally indicate that individuals with higher levels of educational
were more likely to be a member of any NS organisation. Whether the individ-
ual joined the German armed forces as a volunteer or was conscripted is also
included in the model. We do not find that those that volunteered for military
service were more likely to have been NSDAP, SA, or SS members. However,
there is a statistically significant difference with respect to the Hitler Youth;
individuals that volunteered for service in the German armed forces are found
to be more likely to have been members of the Hitler Youth compared to those
who did not volunteer. By default, all models control for an individual’s year
of birth and the year of medical examination. These variables constitute im-
portant control variables that capture any variation in membership that solely
reflects different stages on an individual’s educational or career ladder. As for
NSDAP, SA and SS, those individuals born earlier had had more opportunities
to join any of these parties prior to medical examination (cohort effect). Sim-
ilarly, it may be reasonable to assume that for more advanced careers, returns
to membership were higher. On the other hand, the same control variables
capture a different effect with respect to membership in Hitler Youth. Slightly
older individuals, or those who joined the armed forces early might have been
simply too old by the time of medical examination to have been a member of
the Nazis youth organisation. Accordingly, we find that birth year is positively
related to membership of the Hitler Youth, but negatively related to NSDAP,
SA and SS membership in general. Age at medical examination is positively
correlated with NSDAP membership and negatively correlated with SA, SS and
Hitler Youth membership. We do not find consistent results when we control
for the city size: the only noteworthy finding is that individuals from areas with
fewer than 2,000 inhabitants were more likely to join the SA (not reported in
tables).
How do our findings compare to that of the previous Nazi membership liter-
ature? The results indicate that NSDAP members were more highly educated
and held higher occupational status than non-members. Interestingly, higher
levels of education and social standing are also associated with membership of
other NS organisations, even the ‘proletarian’ SA (Stachura, 2014b, p.108). To
visually compare the social background of NS members to non-members in the
12
Figure 1: BACKGROUND OF NS MEMBERS v. NON-MEMBERS
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sample, four histograms are presented for each organisation (figure 1). Fig 1
(a) examines membership of NSDAP. This shows that higher occupations were
over represented in the party while lower occupations were underrepresented,
with a similar picture visible for the SS in fig 1 (b). Fig 1 (c) confirms that
lower occupations were better represented among SA members but were under-
represented nonetheless. Not surprisingly the occupational background of HJ
members most closely matches that of non-members, although even here higher
level occupations are overrepresented (fig 1 (d)). Were the Nazis a ‘catch-all
party’ or an organisation of the elite? Our findings suggest that these defini-
tions are not mutually exclusive. Clearly the party managed to attract support
from all levels of society. However the goal of an organisation that mirrored
German society was not fully achieved: it is clear that higher-level occupations
were overrepresented in all NS organisations, even the in Hitler Youth.
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4.2 Membership and Intergenerational Mobility
The next part of the analysis examines the relationship between membership of
NS organizations and social mobility. Did individuals benefit from membership
of these organizations? To determine this, we firstly construct a measure of
social mobility by comparing the occupation of an individual’s father to that
practiced by the son at the time of medical examination. Specifically, we take
the Armstrong category of the son’s occupation and subtract the corresponding
value for the father. For example, if an individual is in a category 4 (semi-
professional) occupation and their father had a category 2 occupation (semi-
skilled worker), then they would be assigned a social mobility score of two.7
As such, social mobility scores have a possible range of between -4 and +4. A
histogram of the calculated social mobility scores for the sample can be seen
in figure 2. This shows that 45% of individuals were in the same occupational
category as their fathers and that relatively few individuals experienced extreme
changes in social status from one generation to the next. To examine how
intergenerational occupational mobility in our sample compares to that of other
times and places we construct a simple measure of mobility based on Long
and Ferrie (2013). Firstly, the occupational categories of fathers and sons are
cross-tabulated in Table 3. An simple measure of intergenerational occupational
mobility is given by the proportion of sons in an occupational category that
is different to their father’s, which for our sample is 53.5 per cent. By way
of comparison, Long and Ferrie calculate that the corresponding figures for
Britain and the US in the late nineteenth century were 42.6 and 45.3 per cent
respectively, and in the second half of the twentieth century, 45.3 and 56.7,
respectively. This suggests that intergenerational occupational mobility was
relatively high in Germany during this period.8
Next we examine the determinants of intergenerational mobility. As a first
pass we estimate a model using OLS with our measure of social mobility as the
7Of course, this is a crude measure of occupational mobility, as there are likely to be
non-linearities involved. We address this issue in the next section.
8Long and Ferrie (2013) use a classification based on four groups: White collar, Farmer,
skilled/semi-skilled and unskilled. The expulsion of women, Jews and ‘non-Aryans’ from many
positions during this period, makes it difficult to compare social mobility to other places and
times however. As many as 867,000 Jews and ‘non-Aryans’ were affected by the various decrees
enacted from 1933 onward to remove ‘non-Aryans’ from the civil service and the professions
(Kaplan, 1998, p.25). This, as well as the dislocation of a war-time economy, may also be a
reason to expect a higher measured level of upward social mobility in our sample.
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dependent variable. Equation (2) illustrates the testing framework:
SMi = α+ βNSi + γXi +  (2)
On the right-hand-side we include our variable of interest: whether the indi-
vidual was a member of a particular NS organisation, as well as a number of
important control variables, indicated by X. These include controls for religion,
age, year of medical examination, education and urbanisation. In addition, fa-
ther’s occupation is included in the model. This reflects the fact that the ability
to move up or down the occupational ladder depends on where the father be-
gan. For example, a person whose father held a category 5 occupation cannot
climb any higher on the scale, but can at best maintain that status or move
downwards. Therefore the degree of social mobility of the son is conditional on
the father’s starting point. Finally, all regressions include district (Kreis) fixed
effects. The results of the regressions can be seen in Table 4. Each column
shows the results for the four NS organizations in turn. Column 1 shows the
relationship between membership of the Nazi party (NSDAP) and social mo-
bility. It indicates a positive relationship between Nazi party membership and
upward social mobility. Specifically, being a party member is associated with
0.22 points higher social mobility. A similar relationship between membership of
the SS and mobility can be seen in column 2, while a small positive relationship
is evident for membership of the SA and HJ in columns 3 and 4, indicating a
stronger relationship between upward mobility and membership of the ‘elite’ NS
organisations. Columns 6, 7 and 9 show that these results are robust to control-
ling for education, although a strong, positive relationship between education
level and social mobility can be observed. Likewise, results are similar when
all membership types are included in the same model (columns 5 and 10). To
put the relationship in context, the effect of being a NSDAP member on social
mobility is similar to the difference between having no school leaving qualifica-
tions (reference) and having a medium level of schooling (0.28 v 0.21 in column
10). Clearly, this is a large effect. Finally column 11 shows the results when the
different types of NS memberships are collapsed into one indicator variable. As
expected, where an individual started from, namely their father’s occupation,
is related to social mobility; those starting from a higher occupational category
are less likely to increase their occupational status further. There is also no ev-
idence that Catholics were less likely to experience an increase in occupational
status relative to non-Catholics (essentially Protestants).
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Figure 2: SOCIAL MOBILITY HISTOGRAM
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Table 3: SOCIAL MOBILITY TABLE
 
Son's Occupation (%) Unskilled Semi-skilled Skilled Semi-prof. Professional Row Sum
Unskilled 23.7 10.8 6.5 3.1 1.3 8.3
Semi-skilled 27.9 39.1 22.5 15.4 10.0 28.7
Skilled 46.7 46.4 63.0 56.3 33.1 54.4
Semi-professional 1.4 3.4 6.7 19.5 27.5 6.9
Professional 0.4 0.3 1.3 5.7 28.1 1.7
Column Sum 100 100 100 100 100 100
Father's Occupation (%)
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Table 4: TOTAL SOCIAL MOBILITY & NS MEMBERSHIP
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4.3 Membership: Self-selection or Reward?
An obvious issue with the analysis above is that the causal link running from
NS organization membership to occupational advancement is not established.
We know that Nazi party members advanced more that non-members, all else
equal, but this could be due to some unobserved characteristic that influences
both party membership and social/occupational advancement, such as ‘drive’
or ‘ambition’. Fortunately, as we have an intermediate observation point on
occupation - namely the occupation that the individual was trained for - we
can start to look beneath the surface of our measure of overall intergenerational
occupational mobility. As trained occupation would have been defined early
in an individual’s career, and would generally have preceded NS membership,
we can examine to what extent intergenerational mobility was driven by early
advances by those with advantageous unobserved characteristics.9 By doing
so we can get a clearer picture of whether the observed upward mobility of
NS members occurred before or after membership. Columns 1-10 of Table 5
show the results of models equivalent to those estimated in the previous section,
but with a new measure of occupational mobility on the left-hand side: the
difference in occupation between what the individual was trained for and the
father’s occupation, or ‘early mobility’. Taking membership of the NSDAP
first in column 1, it emerges that party members were more likely to have
improved their social standing at an early stage by being trained in higher
status occupations relative to non-members. Since the change between father’s
occupation and trained occupation is not likely to have been the result of Nazi
membership - the decision of what occupation to train for in most cases would
have predated membership (or at the least the Nazi takeover in 1933) - this result
suggests that NS members were more likely to be ‘social-climbers’.10 Columns
6 to 10 confirm that education was a strong predictor of social mobility of this
type, while the previous results for other variables remain largely unchanged.
Having uncovered a relationship between NS membership and ‘early mobil-
ity’ we next explore whether the relationship between total mobility and NS
membership, as shown in table 4, remains once we account for this ‘early mobil-
ity’. To explore this we include our measure of ‘early mobility’ as an additional
explanatory variable. These results can be seen in table 6. Unsurprisingly, ‘early
mobility’ is closely related to total social mobility. Individuals with the high-
9For example, the mean age of joining the NSDAP was 27 for our sample.
10This claim will be tested in the robustness section.
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est level of education appear to climb higher than those with lower education
levels, even after controlling for early movement up the social ladder. However
the most important results in the context of our analysis are those that related
to NS membership. The relationship between NS membership and total social
mobility, after controlling for an individual’s ‘early mobility’ is not robust. The
relatively strong and significant relationship apparent in table 4 becomes a small
and insignificant effect. We interpret this as evidence that NS organisations at-
tracted individuals who climbed the social ladder early on in their careers. We
find little evidence that the apparent relationship between NS membership and
social mobility is driven by party members being able to achieve occupational
status beyond that of their level of training. Put differently, we find that the
‘selection’ effect dominates the ‘reward’ effect.
4.4 Membership: Date of Joining
Another approach to examining the relationship between social advancement
and NS membership is to look at differences between different types of mem-
bers. One particular way that membership can be differentiated is by date of
joining. It is conceivable that those joining the party after the Nazi takeover
in 1933 had different motivations to those members who joined when the party
was still on the political fringe before 1930. The Nazi party itself was con-
cerned enough about opportunistic new members flooding the party to restrict
the admission of new members between June 1933 and 1937 (Unger, 1974). In-
deed within the party, a distinct hierarchy emerged after 1933, with the Alte
Ka¨mpfer, or the old guard, displaying resentment towards the Septemberlinge -
those that joined the party in the wake of the September 1930 electoral break-
through. The Ma¨rzveilchen, (March Violets) - those who joined the party after
the 1933 seizure of power - were viewed with particular contempt (Grunberger,
2013). To examine whether date of joining the party is related to social mobility,
we divide our NS memberships into three categories: those who joined before
1931, those who joined between 1931 and 1932 and those that joined from 1933
onward. We then run regressions for each of our three measures of occupational
mobility with the results shown in Table 7. Taking membership of the NSDAP
first (column 1), it is evident that both early and late joiners were more likely
to be in a higher status occupation than that of their fathers. However, if we
examine the equivalent coefficients in the regression which includes ‘early mobil-
ity’ as an explanatory variable, we find little evidence of a relationship between
19
Table 5: EARLY MOBILITY & NS MEMBERSHIP
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Table 6: TOTAL MOBILITY & NS MEMBERSHIP INC. EARLY MOBILITY
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membership and mobility (column 6). This indicates that, even for members
that joined the party early on, social mobility predated membership and that
’socially mobile’ individuals self-selected into membership. For the SS and SA,
it would appear that the positive relationship between membership and social
mobility observed in tables 4 and 5 is driven mainly by those who joined the
part from 1933 onward.
5 Robustness
The previous section uncovered a link between party membership and occupa-
tional advancement and that this link was mainly driven by individuals who
demonstrated early mobility self-selecting into NS membership. However, there
are a number of checks that must be performed to test the robustness of these
findings. Firstly, there are likely to be non-linearities in the measure of social
mobility employed. To test the robustness of our result, we run a series of
different formulations of the dependent variable. Instead of defining the social
mobility variable as an integer number between -4 and 4, we re-code it as a
binary variable that equals one if there is a positive (negative) change in oc-
cupational status (i.e. change is equal to one (minus one)) and zero otherwise.
We also examine whether big changes in occupational status were associated
with NS memberships, as well as examining the likelihood of retaining the same
occupational status.11 Finally, we implement an ordered probit model, rank-
ing changes in occupational status from greatest fall to greatest increase. Our
conclusions, based on the original analysis, remain unaltered.12
In the analysis of the previous section the assumption is made that NS
membership did not influence the occupation than an individual was trained for.
To test this assumption we exclude individuals that, in all likelihood, would have
had their trained occupation determined after the Nazi seizure of power, namely
individuals that were under eighteen years of age in 1933.13 Reassuringly, the
results of the previous analysis are similar to those using this reduced sample
(appendix Table A1).
11“Big” changes were defined as movements greater than plus or minus 1.
12Results reported in the appenix, tables A2-A7.
13We also consider cut-offs of twenty-one and sixteen in 1933 (not reported).
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6 Conclusion
Do members of political organizations receive economic benefits? Or are more
‘driven’ or ‘high ability’ types more likely to join? Our analysis suggests that,
in the case of the rank and file of NS organisations, the relationship between
between social advancement and political connections is driven primarily by the
latter. In the first part of the paper we examine the determinants of Nazi mem-
bership and add a unique perspective to this substantial literature. We find
that higher-educated individuals and those from higher socioeconomic back-
grounds were more likely to be members of not just the NSDAP, but all NS
organisations. We then undertake something more novel, exploring the rela-
tionship between membership of NS organisations and socioeconomic mobility.
We find a positive relationship between NS membership and intergenerational
occupational advancement. Indeed we find that this relationship is stronger for
the more ‘elite’ NS organisations, the NSDAP and the SS. However, we also un-
cover that NS members were more likely to have achieved social advancement at
an early stage, suggesting that these individuals self-selected into membership.
Although we cannot say whether members benefitted in other ways, such as
through direct financial rewards or non-monetary benefits, our findings suggest
that the observed positive relationship between social mobility and NS mem-
bership was driven mainly by unobserved charateristics. We find little evidence
in our analysis of a direct ‘reward’ effect for members once we control for this
‘early mobility’. Additionally we find that both early and late NSDAP joiners
demonstrated higher ‘early mobility’. Even among early joiners of the party our
analysis uncovers little evidence of direct patronage.
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 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NS membership
NSDAP 0.34* 0.12
(1.68) (0.46)
SS -0.07 -0.51*
(-0.31) (-1.77)
SA 0.11 -0.08
(0.93) (-0.54)
HJ 0.35*** 0.22**
(4.53) (2.35)
Father's occupation -1.88*** -1.00*** -1.88*** -1.00*** -1.88*** -1.00*** -1.89*** -1.01***
(-34.61) (-14.62) (-34.59) (-14.55) (-34.59) (-14.58) (-34.70) (-14.72)
Early Mobility 1.83*** 1.83*** 1.83*** 1.82***
(31.83) (31.89) (31.85) (31.71)
Schooling level
High 1.79*** 0.33 1.80*** 0.34 1.80*** 0.33 1.79*** 0.33
(6.62) (0.94) (6.67) (0.97) (6.64) (0.96) (6.60) (0.95)
Medium 0.60*** 0.07 0.61*** 0.07 0.61*** 0.07 0.58** 0.06
(2.64) (0.25) (2.66) (0.25) (2.65) (0.26) (2.53) (0.21)
Low 0.28 -0.01 0.28 -0.01 0.28 -0.01 0.27 -0.02
(1.30) (-0.05) (1.31) (-0.05) (1.30) (-0.05) (1.25) (-0.06)
Unknown 0.57** 0.06 0.57** 0.06 0.57** 0.06 0.57** 0.06
(2.52) (0.20) (2.51) (0.19) (2.48) (0.21) (2.49) (0.21)
Religion
Roman Catholic -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
(-0.08) (0.08) (-0.14) (-0.02) (-0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.15)
Controls
Year or birth YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Age at medical examination YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Urbanisation YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 9,430 8,360 9,430 8,360 9,430 8,360 9,430 8,360
z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Fixed effects logit model. All reference categories are as in Table 2.
TABLE A2: POSITIVE (+1) SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NS MEMBERSHIP INCLUDING EARLY MOBILITY
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 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NS membership
NSDAP -0.26 -0.14
(-1.23) (-0.54)
SS -0.30 -0.15
(-1.34) (-0.59)
SA 0.01 0.06
(0.13) (0.47)
HJ -0.02 0.10
(-0.27) (1.03)
Father's occupation 1.13*** 0.42*** 1.13*** 0.43*** 1.13*** 0.42*** 1.13*** 0.42***
(28.35) (8.28) (28.35) (8.28) (28.32) (8.23) (28.32) (8.15)
Early Mobility -1.33*** -1.33*** -1.33*** -1.33***
(-28.97) (-28.94) (-28.98) (-28.99)
Schooling level
High -1.04*** 0.03 -1.04*** 0.03 -1.04*** 0.03 -1.04*** 0.03
(-4.24) (0.11) (-4.26) (0.11) (-4.28) (0.09) (-4.27) (0.08)
Medium -0.54** -0.03 -0.54*** -0.04 -0.55*** -0.04 -0.54*** -0.04
(-2.56) (-0.13) (-2.59) (-0.14) (-2.59) (-0.14) (-2.58) (-0.16)
Low -0.28 -0.02 -0.28 -0.02 -0.28 -0.03 -0.28 -0.03
(-1.42) (-0.09) (-1.44) (-0.10) (-1.44) (-0.10) (-1.43) (-0.10)
Unknown -0.49** 0.01 -0.49** 0.01 -0.49** 0.00 -0.49** 0.01
(-2.32) (0.03) (-2.33) (0.03) (-2.33) (0.02) (-2.33) (0.03)
Religion
Roman Catholic 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.83) (0.64) (0.77) (0.62) (0.87) (0.67) (0.85) (0.70)
Controls
Year or birth YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Age at medical examination YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Urbanisation YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 9,446 8,364 9,446 8,364 9,446 8,364 9,446 8,364
z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Fixed effects logit model. All reference categories are as in Table 2.
TABLE A3: NEGATIVE (-1) SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NS MEMBERSHIP INCLUDING EARLY MOBILITY
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 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NS membership
NSDAP -0.03 -0.04
(-0.19) (-0.23)
SS 0.13 0.14
(0.78) (0.79)
SA -0.02 0.02
(-0.27) (0.22)
HJ -0.21*** -0.22***
(-3.45) (-3.38)
Father's occupation 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.09*** 0.18***
(2.84) (4.31) (2.82) (4.27) (2.84) (4.29) (2.98) (4.53)
Early Mobility 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
(1.40) (1.36) (1.39) (1.58)
Schooling level
High -0.52*** -0.51** -0.52*** -0.51** -0.52*** -0.51** -0.50** -0.51**
(-2.58) (-2.33) (-2.60) (-2.34) (-2.58) (-2.34) (-2.52) (-2.30)
Medium -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02
(-0.16) (0.04) (-0.16) (0.04) (-0.15) (0.04) (-0.07) (0.11)
Low 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08
(0.12) (0.46) (0.12) (0.46) (0.12) (0.46) (0.14) (0.48)
Unknown -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03
(-0.09) (0.17) (-0.08) (0.18) (-0.08) (0.17) (-0.08) (0.17)
Religion
Roman Catholic -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00
(-0.16) (0.18) (-0.11) (0.24) (-0.17) (0.19) (-0.31) (0.05)
Controls
Year or birth YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Age at medical examination YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Urbanisation YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 9,542 8,471 9,542 8,471 9,542 8,471 9,542 8,471
z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Fixed effects logit model. All reference categories are as in Table 2.
TABLE A4: NO (0) SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NS MEMBERSHIP INCLUDING EARLY MOBILITY
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 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NS membership
NSDAP 0.97*** 0.60
(2.66) (1.19)
SS 1.07*** 0.40
(2.81) (0.73)
SA 0.39 0.31
(1.45) (0.86)
HJ -0.03 -0.44
(-0.12) (-1.53)
Father's occupation -2.88*** -1.75*** -2.87*** -1.73*** -2.88*** -1.75*** -2.87*** -1.72***
(-20.36) (-8.20) (-20.29) (-8.16) (-20.34) (-8.19) (-20.31) (-8.11)
Early Mobility 2.71*** 2.72*** 2.72*** 2.73***
(16.28) (16.31) (16.33) (16.38)
Schooling level
High 3.79*** 1.68** 3.71*** 1.59** 3.76*** 1.60** 3.78*** 1.59**
(6.36) (2.09) (6.24) (1.97) (6.31) (1.99) (6.34) (1.99)
Medium 1.01* -0.15 1.01* -0.18 1.01* -0.18 1.03* -0.22
(1.80) (-0.21) (1.81) (-0.26) (1.80) (-0.26) (1.83) (-0.32)
Low 0.02 -0.62 0.01 -0.64 0.02 -0.65 0.03 -0.67
(0.04) (-0.94) (0.03) (-0.97) (0.04) (-0.98) (0.05) (-1.01)
Unknown 0.77 -0.23 0.73 -0.28 0.73 -0.29 0.75 -0.31
(1.38) (-0.33) (1.31) (-0.40) (1.31) (-0.40) (1.33) (-0.44)
Religion
Roman Catholic -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15
(-0.71) (-0.57) (-0.62) (-0.55) (-0.70) (-0.56) (-0.76) (-0.69)
Controls
Year or birth YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Age at medical examination YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Urbanisation YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 8,751 7,678 8,751 7,678 8,751 7,678 8,751 7,678
z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Fixed effects logit model. All reference categories are as in Table 2.
TABLE A5: "BIG" (> +1) POSITIVE SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NS MEMBERSHIP INCLUDING EARLY MOBILITY
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 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NS membership
NSDAP -0.47 -0.22
(-1.13) (-0.42)
SS -1.28** -1.20*
(-2.32) (-1.86)
SA -0.18 -0.23
(-0.85) (-0.85)
HJ -0.08 -0.01
(-0.60) (-0.03)
Father's occupation 1.93*** 0.94*** 1.94*** 0.96*** 1.93*** 0.94*** 1.93*** 0.94***
(25.57) (8.87) (25.59) (8.97) (25.57) (8.86) (25.54) (8.82)
Early Mobility -2.22*** -2.22*** -2.22*** -2.22***
(-22.11) (-22.08) (-22.11) (-22.11)
Schooling level
High -1.70*** -0.10 -1.69*** -0.10 -1.69*** -0.07 -1.70*** -0.10
(-3.77) (-0.16) (-3.75) (-0.15) (-3.75) (-0.10) (-3.79) (-0.15)
Medium -0.78* 0.40 -0.78** 0.38 -0.78* 0.41 -0.78* 0.39
(-1.95) (0.67) (-1.97) (0.64) (-1.96) (0.68) (-1.96) (0.66)
Low -0.05 0.95* -0.05 0.96* -0.05 0.95* -0.05 0.95*
(-0.14) (1.70) (-0.12) (1.72) (-0.14) (1.71) (-0.14) (1.69)
Unknown -0.96** 0.40 -0.96** 0.42 -0.96** 0.41 -0.97** 0.40
(-2.41) (0.66) (-2.41) (0.71) (-2.39) (0.69) (-2.42) (0.67)
Religion
Roman Catholic 0.05 -0.06 0.03 -0.09 0.06 -0.05 0.05 -0.05
(0.39) (-0.33) (0.24) (-0.49) (0.43) (-0.31) (0.41) (-0.30)
Controls
Year or birth YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Age at medical examination YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Urbanisation YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 8,802 7,776 8,802 7,776 8,802 7,776 8,802 7,776
z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Fixed effects logit model. All reference categories are as in Table 2.
TABLE A6: "BIG" (<-1) NEGATIVE SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NS MEMBERSHIP INCLUDING EARLY MOBILITY
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
NSDAP NSDAP SS SS SA SA HJ HJ
Social Mobility Score
-4 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-3 -0.000** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-2 -0.012*** -0.001 -0.017*** -0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.004*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
-1 -0.061*** -0.032 -0.084*** -0.025 -0.019 0.004 -0.021*** 0.008
(0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
0 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1 0.068*** 0.037 0.094*** 0.029 0.021 -0.004 0.023*** -0.009
(0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
2 0.006*** 0.000 0.009*** 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
3 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 0.000 NA 0.000 NA 0.000 NA 0.000 NA
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls
Early Mobility NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Schooling level YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Father's occupation YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Religion YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year or birth YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Age at medical examination YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Urbanisation YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 10,000 8,884 10,000 8,884 10,000 8,884 10,000 8,884
 All predictors at their mean value. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
District fixed effects not possible to incorporate  in ordered probit model.
TABLE A7: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOLLOWING ORDERED PROBIT 
SOCIAL MOBILITY AND NS MEMBERSHIP INCLUDING EARLY MOBILITY
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